NEW YORK TIMES

2 1 OCT 1974

C.I.A. Said to Have Asked Funds

for Chile Rightists in '73

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 20-The Central Intelligence Agency sought to finance an extreme right-wing opposition group in Chile six weeks before the overthrow of President Salvadore throw of President Salvadore Whether the 40 Commit-1973, highly reliable sources said today.

The sources said that the first word of the C.I.A.'s attempt to become involved with the extremist group became known two weeks ago when a close aide to Secretary of State Kissinger leaked documents in an effort to discredit a former high Nixon Administration intelligence official who was known to be privately critical of Mr. Kissinger's role in Chile.

The documents, although intended to show that there was a consensus inside the Administration over the clandestine C.I.A. operations in Chile have instead raised new questions about the extent of the ecret United States involvement in the overthrow of Dr. Allende.

The sources said that Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Mr. Rissexecutive assistant, leaked three summaries of proposals for clandestine C.L.A. operations in Chile during a briefing for the CBS feletation newsman Daniel Schort. The documents had been premared of the 40 Committee, the highlevel intelligence board that reviews covert activities for the United States Government.

A Reactionary Group

The 1973 document, sources said, showed that as late as July 5, 1973, the C.I.A. recommended to the 40 Committee that \$200,000 be provided clan- lly guarded government secrets. destinely to the National party in Chile, a conservative group that had urged Chileans to reject-with Violence if necessarv-the Allende Administration as "illegitimate" and "unconstitutional."

The Nationa lparty was considered to represent the views of the propertied class in Chile and, in the year before the overthrow of Dr. Allende, was known to have close ties to Patria vilibertad, a teactionary group that openly beasted of its involvement in military clforcs to overthrow the Allende Government.

closures last month of the C.I.A. operations in Chile, knowledgeable Ford Administration officials have mainted that the main goal was to enable moderate political factors to survive the Allende period.

proposed funds for the National party could not be learned but William E. Coppy, the C.L.A. director, told a libitse invibigence subcommittee earlier this year that \$1-million wasauthorized in August, 1973, for use in Chile. Mr. Colby further testified, however, that less than \$50,000 was actually spent because of the coup d'état in Chile the next month.

Mr. Eagleburger's intention in briefing Mr. Schorr, the sources said, was to rebuff off-therecord statements made to the newsman earlier by Ray S. Cline, the former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, Mr. Cline par-ticipated in 40 Committee deliberations on Chile from 1970 to 1973 and has recently criticized Mr. Kissinger's role at those meetings.

The disclosure of the documents took place less than a week after Mr. Kisinger, through his spokesman, had publicly called such leaks "a disgrace to the Foreign Servfor meetings in 1970 and 1973 lice and dangerous to national security.

> One of the 1970 documents shown to Mr. Schorr included the name of a Chilean Government official who served as a conduit for C.I.A. views and also apparently helped relay funds to anti-Allende forces. Such information traditionally has been among the most close-

A number of persons familiar with State Department operations expressed doubt that Mr. Eagleburger would have shown Mr. Schorr such documents without the direct or indirect concurrence of the Secretary of

Mr. Eagleburger has denied showing Mr. Schorr any or, amonts and insisted that he had personally made the decision to brief Mr. Schorn, "I did not show any documents, mades. Intere or memoranda to a y-body." he said. "I did not describe any of the particular events that were being argued

Since the first published dis- about. All I provided was a general broad statement [cealing with Mr. Cline's rolel.

"Henry's role was only to ask me to do a check of the Mr. Eagleburger said. "It was me, on my own, who told some people what the files-

Mr. Schorr has made no

public use of the materials reportedly supplied by Mr. Eagleburger and in a telephone interview refused to discuss the issue, adding: "I don't know what you are talking about."

The first word of Mr. Eagleburger's action came indirectly from State Department officials who learned that a search had been made of the department's special vault containing its 40 Committee documents.

In a telephone interview yesterday, Mr. Eagleburger ac-knowledged that Mr. Kissinger had authorized file searches both of the National Security Council minutes in the White House and of the 40 Committee documents stored in the State Department in an effort "to see whether we could come up with something that would indicate whether those [Mr. Cline's] statements were correct."

As Mr. Eagleburger described it, the file searches began shortly after Mr. Klssinger learned that Mr. Cline, who retired last year, "had made some statements about his opposition to a number of activities in Chile and Henry and Nixon had overruled him and the State Department."

"It is true," Mr. Eagleburger added, "that I have told some people who asked about it that the documents made available demonstrated the opposite of what Cline said."

"I guess that I have to say that a chec kof the files showed in othing to support the content tion that Mr. Cline and stared any opposition to a series that had some to the to committee on Chile," he secout "In fact, those files demonstrated; the opposite."

In an interview with The New York Times published Thursday, Mr Cline said that a the impetus for the Chile programs had come from either: Mr. Kissinger or Fresident Nixon, or both, Mr. Cline also confirmed that the C.I.A.'s ac-

tivities in Chile included the financial support of strikes by shopkeepers and truckers.

President Ford and Mr. Kissinger have said that the C.I.A. funding in Chile was limited to opposition newspapers and politicians.

Told of Mr. Eagleburger's efforts to contradict his views, Mr. Cline said that he was "unwilling to comment on the staff papers prepared for 40 Committee meetings."

"No one should discuss internal papers of such impor-tance." he added.

Mr. Cline, who served with the C.I.A. for more than 20 years before becoming the head of State Department intelligence, is now executive director of the Georgetown University School of Strategic Studies.

The Three Documents

The three documents described by Mr. Eagleburger dealt with the State Department's comments on C.J.A. proposais to be discussed at 40 committee meetings.

According to reliable sources, Mr. Cline, as director of intelligence, could make additional recommendations or comments on the documents, which were to be forwarded to the Undersecretary for Political Aifairs, the official who traditionally represented State on. the 40 Committee.

The first document, the sources said, was dated Aug. 31, 1970, and dealt with the C.I.A. recommendations in case the pending Chilean presidential elections resulted in a runoff involving Dr. Allende.

Three proposals, or options, for investing money in amounts ranging from \$350,000 to \$900,-000 were reported discussed, with the State Department urging limited funds or no funds at all for covers activities. Mr. Cline, in a handwritten comment, called for major tinancial support for anti-Allende forces

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if it could "make a difference" between victory or defeat for Dr. Allende, the source said.

A second document, dated Sept. 4, 1970, the day Dr. Allende barely won the Chilean election, reportedly discussed a C.I.A. proposal for bribing members of the Chilean Congress, which, under that country's Constitution, would have to ratify the election and thus ultimately choose the President.

Wymberly Coerr, then the State Department's coordinator for 40 Committee staff recommendations, urged that no program involving what he termed "subornation" be initiated, according to the sources.

Mr. Cline, in another hand-written comment, reportedly depicted Mr. Coerr as being "hung up" on the emotional overtones of the world of realpolitik." Mr. Cline is said to have written such activities do take place.

Spending Authorized

The 40 Committee eventually recommended that \$350,000 be spent in an attempt to bribe the Congress, which voted nonetheless in October to ratify Dr. Allende as President.

The third document, dated July 25, 1973, was said to have been forwarded to William J. Porter, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, by Jack B. Kubisch, then the Assistant Secretary for State for Inter-American Affairs. The document reportedly discussed C.I.A. proposals for clandestine financing of the anti-Allende political parties, including a specific recommendation that \$350,000 be given to the Christian Democrats and another suggestion that \$200,000 be given to the National party.

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